Implementing Corporate Social Responsibility: Empirical Insights on the Impact of the UN Global Compact on Its Business Participants by Schembera, Stefan








Implementing Corporate Social Responsibility: Empirical Insights on the
Impact of the UN Global Compact on Its Business Participants
Schembera, Stefan
Abstract: The implementation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is crucial for the legitimacy of an
organization in today’s globalized economy. This study aims to enrich our knowledge of the implementa-
tion of the largest voluntary CSR initiative—the UN Global Compact (UNGC). Drawing on insights from
stakeholder, network, and institutional theory, I derive a positive impact of UNGC participation dura-
tion on the implementation level of the UNGC principles, despite potential weaknesses in the initiative’s
accountability structure. Moreover, I scrutinize the validity of the newly introduced UNGC “Differentia-
tion Programme” before applying this framework in the empirical analysis. Results from ordinal, linear,
and instrumental variable regression models suggest that, contrary to claims made by UNGC critics, the
duration of UNGC participation does affect the level of UNGC implementation. However, this effect
appears to be much smaller than previous practitioner studies have suggested. Moreover, strong local
UNGC networks affect the implementation level of the UNGC positively. Their hypothesized moderating
role between UNGC participation duration and UNGC implementation level, however, is only significant
in networks with activities of high quality rather than high quantity.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650316635579





Schembera, Stefan (2018). Implementing Corporate Social Responsibility: Empirical Insights on the
Impact of the UN Global Compact on Its Business Participants. Business Society, 57(5):783-825.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650316635579
Business & Society
2018, Vol. 57(5) 783 –825








Empirical Insights on the 
Impact of the UN Global 




The implementation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is crucial for 
the legitimacy of an organization in today’s globalized economy. This study 
aims to enrich our knowledge of the implementation of the largest voluntary 
CSR initiative—the UN Global Compact (UNGC). Drawing on insights from 
stakeholder, network, and institutional theory, I derive a positive impact of 
UNGC participation duration on the implementation level of the UNGC 
principles, despite potential weaknesses in the initiative’s accountability 
structure. Moreover, I scrutinize the validity of the newly introduced 
UNGC “Differentiation Programme” before applying this framework 
in the empirical analysis. Results from ordinal, linear, and instrumental 
variable regression models suggest that, contrary to claims made by UNGC 
critics, the duration of UNGC participation does affect the level of UNGC 
implementation. However, this effect appears to be much smaller than 
previous practitioner studies have suggested. Moreover, strong local UNGC 
networks affect the implementation level of the UNGC positively. Their 
hypothesized moderating role between UNGC participation duration and 
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UNGC implementation level, however, is only significant in networks with 
activities of high quality rather than high quantity.
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Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has gained such prominence in organi-
zational theory and practice (De Bakker, Groenewegen, & Den Hond, 2005; 
Economist, 2005; Margolis & Walsh, 2003) that its organizational implemen-
tation has grown into one of the key challenges that organizations face 
(Gilbert & Rasche, 2008; Knudsen, 2011; Maon, Lindgreen, & Swaen, 2009). 
In the process of globalization, many companies extended their operations 
across national borders and, in certain cases, even came to hold greater eco-
nomic and social power than some governments (Beck & Camiller, 2000). 
With the development of global exchange, the causes and effects of socio-
environmental problems, such as corruption, human rights violations, and 
global warming, have also expanded transnationally. The regulatory power of 
national governmental agencies to address transnational social and environ-
mental challenges is eroding and has shifted to multiple actors including mul-
tinational corporations (MNCs; Campbell, 2007; Fransen & Burgoon, 2014; 
Scherer, Palazzo, & Baumann, 2006). Pressures for MNCs to take on a politi-
cal role are real, as industry leaders such as Nike, Exxon, Nestlé, and Pfizer 
can attest (Maon et al., 2009; Matten & Crane, 2005; Vogel, 2010).
Social accountability initiatives such as the UN Global Compact (UNGC), 
the SA 8000 social accountability standard, and the ISO 26000 CSR standard 
offer businesses means of complementing legislation to adequately address 
social, environmental, and anti-corruption issues (Christmann & Taylor, 2006; 
Rasche, Waddock, & McIntosh, 2013; Vogel, 2010). The UNGC is the most 
prominent voluntary CSR initiative worldwide; participants commit to 10 uni-
versal principles in the areas of human rights, labor standards, the environment, 
and anti-corruption (UNGC, 2012b). The overarching goal of the initiative is to 
serve as a long-term CSR learning platform (Kell & Levin, 2003; Palazzo & 
Scherer, 2010; Rasche, 2009). “Learning” in this article refers to a participant’s 
progress regarding “the development, implementation, and disclosure of sus-
tainability policies and practices” (UNGC, 2012a) in the context of the 10 prin-
ciples. Broadly speaking, organizational learning can be defined as the 
institutionalization of new organizational structures, routines, or strategies that 
lead to changes in action (Kell & Levin, 2003; Levitt & March, 1988).
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To date, however, scholars have conducted little empirical research on the 
impact of the UNGC, despite the potential significance of such an initiative for 
the corporate world (Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Maon et al., 2009; Margolis & 
Walsh, 2003; Runhaar & Lafferty, 2009). Of the studies addressing the impact of 
the UNGC empirically, many have focused on differences between participants 
and nonparticipants (Bernhagen & Mitchell, 2010; Mwangi, Rieth, & Schmitz, 
2013). I will outline potential limitations of such a focus by highlighting that 
firms may nonrandomly opt into one of the two groups, and argue why it is 
important to conduct more research focusing on the impact of the UNGC among 
its participants. Furthermore, considering the varying scope and measurement 
techniques in existing studies, it does not appear surprising that findings with 
regard to the impact of UNGC participation on business practices are mixed 
(Rasche et al., 2013). Some studies are based on only a few companies (Baumann-
Pauly & Scherer, 2013; Rieth, 2009; Runhaar & Lafferty, 2009) or a single coun-
try (Berliner & Prakash, 2015; Hamann, Sinha, Kapfudzaruwa, & Schild, 2009), 
whereas others examine particular CSR policies whose implementation is not 
directly tied to the UNGC principles (Bernhagen & Mitchell, 2010).
While practitioner studies offer first quantitative insights on the impact 
among participants, the self-assessments of the respondents are not based on 
explicit implementation criteria (McKinsey, 2007; UNGC, 2012c). Their 
results suggest that UNGC participation duration has a high positive impact 
on the implementation of the 10 principles; critics, however, continue to 
reject this conclusion (Deva, 2006; Sethi & Schepers, 2014). Some even 
argue that “all credible and publicly available data and documentation con-
clusively demonstrate that the UNGC has failed to induce its signatory com-
panies to enhance their CSR efforts and integrate the 10 principles in their 
policies and operations” (Sethi & Schepers, 2014, p. 193).
The aim of the present work is thus to enrich our knowledge on whether 
the Global Compact has an impact among its business participants as regards 
the implementation of its principles over the duration of participation. The 
newly introduced UNGC “Differentiation Programme” thereby offers, for the 
first time, a comprehensive framework providing three different levels of 
UNGC implementation: “Learner Platform” (Learner), “GC Active” (Active), 
and “GC Advanced” (Advanced). Launched in February 2011, this program 
prescribes that its participants assess their UNGC implementation by choos-
ing one of these three levels based on a set of predefined criteria. I use this 
measure as dependent variable (DV) in my empirical analyses, and provide 
insights on its validity in the online appendix.
As UNGC participants, companies have the obligation to communicate with 
their stakeholders on a regular basis. Furthermore, they have the possibility to 
collaborate with them in the course of various UNGC network events. 
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Stakeholder theory (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Jones, 1995) 
suggests that managing stakeholder relationships in such a manner has an impact 
on organizational practices. Beyond global coordination with stakeholders, 
scholars have argued about the importance of strong local stakeholder networks 
to generate desired outcomes (Rasche, 2012; Vormedal, 2005). Critics, however, 
point to the initiative’s lack of accountability mechanisms and of guidance on 
how the principles should be implemented (Hemphill, 2005; Williams, 2004). 
They argue that companies with a poor reputation may simply choose to join the 
UNGC without intending to actually implement its principles in their organiza-
tional structures, assuming that the mere association with the United Nations 
allows them to create a positive image. In allusion to the blue UN flag, this 
practice is derogatorily referred to as “bluewashing” (Knudsen, 2011, p. 334).
To contribute to the controversial debate on whether the UNGC has an 
impact on its business participants, despite the lack of stringent accountabil-
ity mechanisms, the central research question this study seeks to address can 
be stated as follows:
Research Question: Does longer UNGC participation duration lead to 
higher levels of UNGC implementation?
To answer this question, I apply multiple analytical approaches including 
ordinal and linear regression analyses. In addition, instrumental variable (IV) 
models address the concern that companies participating in the UNGC may 
not simply be comparable with nonparticipants due to their potentially differ-
ent predispositions with regard to various CSR implementation trends 
(Berliner & Prakash, 2015). Contrary to claims by UNGC critics (Sethi & 
Schepers, 2014), my findings suggest that the duration of UNGC participa-
tion does affect the level of UNGC implementation. However, this effect 
seems to be much smaller than previous practitioner studies suggested. 
Moreover, strong local UNGC networks affect the implementation level of 
the UNGC positively. Their hypothesized moderating role between UNGC 
participation duration and UNGC implementation level, however, is only sig-
nificant in networks with activities of high quality rather than high quantity; 
that is, only high quality networks affect older UNGC business participants 
more (positively) than younger ones. Finally, firm size and public ownership 
seem to be the strongest drivers for UNGC implementation.
Implementing CSR in the UNGC: Theory and 
Empirical Evidence
For a long time, the literature on CSR mainly concentrated on whether CSR 
is good for profits (Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Peloza, 2009). Most studies 
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treated CSR as a “black box” (independent variable), and only 15% treated it 
as the DV (Margolis & Walsh, 2003). Consequently, there was little research 
on how companies implement CSR (Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Rasche, 
2009).
Over the last years, however, social accountability initiatives such as the 
UNGC, the SA 8000, or ISO 26000 standard were instituted to offer busi-
nesses the means and guidance to address social, environmental, and anti-
corruption issues in the absence of a legally binding global governance system 
(Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Rasche et al., 2013; Waddock, 2008). The effec-
tiveness of such initiatives has been a subject of interest in the recent literature 
(Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Maon et al., 2009; O’Rourke, 2003; Runhaar & 
Lafferty, 2009). Although there is some evidence that under certain condi-
tions, international certifiable standards, such as the ISO 9000 general man-
agement or the ISO 14001 environmental management standard, influence 
organizational practices (Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Potoski & Prakash, 
2005), studies on the effectiveness of global standards covering a comprehen-
sive spectrum of CSR issues, such as the UNGC, are so far scarce. Moreover, 
many existing studies on the impact of the UNGC or other voluntary sustain-
ability initiatives focus on comparisons between participants and nonpartici-
pants. For example, Bernhagen and Mitchell (2010) compared the likelihood 
of having internal human rights policies between UNGC participants and non-
participants based on a sample of the largest 2000 companies worldwide. In a 
similar vein, Mwangi et al. (2013) compared the application of sustainability 
reporting standards between UNGC participants and nonparticipants in a sam-
ple of the world’s largest automotive and utility companies.
However, caution is necessary when assessing the impact of the UNGC by 
comparing the performance differences between participants and nonpartici-
pants for at least three related reasons. First, such analyses may not fully 
recognize that the UNGC constitutes a learning platform rather than a certifi-
cation or performance standard, and thus insufficiently address time-related 
effects such as the duration of participation. Second, it is to note that the key 
mission of such an initiative is not to gather a group of participants that out-
performs nonparticipants but to stimulate progress among its participants, 
which may deliberately include those that urgently need CSR guidance (Kell 
& Levin, 2003; Palazzo & Scherer, 2010; Rasche, 2009). As Georg Kell has 
specified in a 2010 interview, “we have always kept the GC’s entry barrier 
intentionally low, so that those that face serious challenges can join the con-
versation, learn from others and improve” (Berliner & Prakash, 2015, 
p. 120). Put differently, the effort of the UNGC to get also “poor performers” 
on board implies that the initiative can have a “positive impact” on its partici-
pants even if assessments reveal that participants fare worse than nonpartici-
pants. Third, the applied methodological approaches in existing studies might 
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have fallen short of accurately capturing inherent challenges when compar-
ing UNGC participants and nonparticipants. Until the recent study by Berliner 
and Prakash (2015), empirical UNGC analyses neglected that firms may non-
randomly opt into the group of UNGC participants, versus nonparticipants, 
due to independent firm tendencies toward different CSR trends over time 
between the two groups. It follows from these considerations that to analyze 
the impact of the UNGC, it is of crucial importance to (a) fully understand 
and adequately assess the drivers of UNGC implementation among its par-
ticipants taking into account their duration of participation and (b) apply 
elaborate analytical approaches addressing nonrandom selection issues when 
comparing UNGC participants and nonparticipants.
Initiated by Kofi Annan at the World Economic Forum in 1999 and for-
mally launched in July 2000, the UNGC spans the whole spectrum of CSR 
issues. Its principles range from human rights and labor standards to environ-
mental and anti-corruption (added in 2004) issues, which are all derived from 
key international declarations (UNGC, 2012b). The UNGC soon evolved 
into the largest and arguably most ambitious voluntary CSR initiative in the 
world (Hemphill, 2005; Rasche, 2009; Vormedal, 2005) and currently com-
prises 8,322 business participants (as of April 29, 2015). The primary goal of 
the initiative is to provide participants with the resources and expertise 
needed to help them implement the 10 UNGC principles. Several scholars 
refer to the UNGC as a comprehensive initiative capturing an extended con-
cept of corporate responsibilities applicable in today’s globalized economy, 
where state actors increasingly lose control over transnational corporate 
activities (Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer et al., 2006).
Since its foundation, the scheme has received both a great deal of support 
and criticism. One major criticism leveled at the UNGC (Hemphill, 2005; 
Rasche, 2009; Williams, 2004) is that the compact’s principles are vague, and 
thus hard to implement. Deva (2006) points out that the UNGC principles 
provide companies with little concrete guidance on the conduct that is 
expected from them. Another common criticism is that companies simply 
join the UNGC to benefit from the UN’s reputation without intending to 
improve the implementation of the UNGC principles (Deva, 2006; Rasche 
et al., 2013; Williams, 2004). Consequently, critics such as Sethi and Schepers 
(2014, p. 193) claim that, due to the design of the initiative lacking stringent 
enforcement mechanisms such as independent monitoring, the UNGC has 
failed to generate enhancements of business participants’ integration of the 
UNGC principles. Deva (2006) seems to have similar concerns: “Dialogue 
with business is a central tool of the Global Compact in ensuring respect for 
its principles, but it is doubtful if the means employed could achieve the 
ends” (p. 146). Similarly, critics from civil society “have questioned claims 
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that the Compact shapes members’ human rights and environmental perfor-
mance, or that its program design can create incentives toward this outcome” 
(Berliner & Prakash, 2015, p. 121).
Since the introduction of the compulsory “Communication on Progress” 
(COP) policy in 2003, corporations have to report annually on the progress 
they have made in implementing the 10 principles. In 2005, the UNGC also 
started to publicly “delist” participants who fail to comply with the COP pol-
icy. However, for a long time, this policy lacked standardized criteria for 
evaluating the progress of participants, as well as incentives for stricter 
implementation. Participants were able to highlight just one CSR issue where 
their record of progress was excellent and conceal other issues where the 
record was poorer (Williams, 2004). To react to this issue, the UNGC intro-
duced the “Differentiation Programme” in February 2011, prescribing for the 
first time that its participants must choose among different levels of UNGC 
implementation criteria. It is now no longer possible for participants (above 
the lowest level of UNGC implementation) to conceal issues where imple-
mentation is poor. Many critical studies on voluntary CSR standards such as 
the UNGC tend to apply a static perspective (Behnam & MacLean, 2011; 
Deva, 2006; Wijen, 2014), that is, they underestimate the potential that struc-
tures, processes, and guidance of such standards may be refined and devel-
oped over time. In contrast, by subsequently adding principles (P10 on 
anti-corruption in 2004), introducing and refining the COP policy (in 2003 
and 2005, respectively), and providing clearer implementation guidance 
through the “Differentiation Programme” (in 2011), the UNGC illustrates the 
evolutionary character of voluntary CSR initiatives.
In sum, the literature review revealed that global quantitative insights on 
the effectiveness of initiatives such as the UNGC, based on measures with 
criteria directly tied to all of the initiative’s principles, are urgently needed. 
Moreover, recent developments appear to be insufficiently addressed by pre-
vious studies taking a rather static perspective on the UNGC and CSR stan-
dards in general. All together, this calls for comprehensive and updated 
analyses on the impact of the UNGC. In particular, one crucial question 
regarding the impact of the UNGC on its participants remains to be answered: 
Compared with the newer participants, have the older participants learned to 
better implement the UNGC principles?
Berliner and Prakash (2015) have significantly enriched our knowledge of 
CSR implementation among and between (non)participants and guide the 
way for future empirical analyses. Their work focused in particular on envi-
ronmental and human rights ratings of U.S. firms and was hence—like other 
studies—not designed to cover the full spectrum of UNGC principles (see 
also Bernhagen & Mitchell, 2010; Perez-Batres, Miller, & Pisani, 2011) and 
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the global dimension of the initiative (Mwangi et al., 2013; Rieth, 2009). The 
aim of this study is hence to contribute to this literature by drawing on a large 
set of companies and countries worldwide and applying the newly available 
“Differentiation Programme” framework, directly tailored to assess UNGC 
implementation.
Hypotheses Development
This study focuses on one type of organizational mechanisms potentially 
driving the level of UNGC implementation: learning among UNGC partici-
pants through stakeholder interaction, dialogue, and networking. 
Acknowledging further down that a great variety of other organizational 
mechanisms exist that may enhance UNGC implementation efforts, I chose 
this focus deliberately as the learning mechanism constitutes the core essence 
and mission of the UNGC (Kell & Levin, 2003). Consequently, I only con-
sider the particular features of the initiative that are exclusively available to 
its participants to derive the “net” impact of the UNGC on the organizational 
practices among its business participants. In fact, the only feature exclusively 
available to UNGC participants is its learning and network structure. Business 
participants are linked with peers, governments, civil society organizations, 
and labor through three engagement mechanisms: learning events, dialogue 
events, and partnership projects (see Palazzo & Scherer, 2010; Rasche, 2009; 
Williams, 2004).
Several models on learning processes in the context of CSR integration 
have been developed, the most prominent of which is arguably Zadek’s 
(2004) model on Nike. Research suggests that there is not a single “best way” 
to manage organizational change and has so far failed to develop a univer-
sally accepted theory of organizational learning; however, it is agreed that 
learning occurs over a period of time (Crossan, Maurer, & White, 2011). 
Moreover, according to a recent CSR implementation framework synthesiz-
ing existing CSR implementation process studies, there seems to be one cen-
tral means of achieving learning that underpins every step of CSR 
implementation: “continuous stakeholder dialogue” (Maon et al., 2009).
Considering the clear focus of the UNGC on achieving learning through 
networking and dialogue with stakeholders, I draw on insights from stake-
holder theory to hypothesize on the impact of the UNGC on its business par-
ticipants. Stakeholders are commonly defined as those “groups or individuals 
who can affect, or are affected by, the achievement of an organization’s mis-
sion” (Freeman, 1984, p. 54). Stakeholders are the central actors that produce 
accountability standards such as the UNGC, as NGOs do, or benefit from their 
implementation, as employees do, and shape the discussion on how standards 
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are put into practice (Gilbert & Rasche, 2008). Certain types of CSR can be 
perceived as manifestations of attempts to establish trusting, cooperative rela-
tionships between businesses and stakeholders (Jones, 1995). Scholars widely 
agree that the interaction between firms and stakeholders is a driver for UNGC 
implementation or CSR in general (Campbell, 2007, p. 962; Mwangi et al., 
2013). Burnes (2004) argues that learning about stakeholder expectations and 
the context in which they operate helps design the appropriate mechanisms for 
positive organizational change.
Applied to the UNGC, sharing best practices and following notable exam-
ples of other UNGC participants, such as businesses from the same industrial 
sector or region, appears crucial for learning (Kell & Levin, 2003; Rasche, 
2009). At the global level, the online Learning Forum is one example of a 
UNGC learning mechanism. It is a database inviting participants to share 
good practice cases and learn from other organizations’ experience in imple-
menting the 10 principles through the GC web portal; the goal is to form a 
knowledge platform that integrates the views of all relevant stakeholders, and 
at the same time increases the transparency of participants’ activities (Kell & 
Levin, 2003; Vormedal, 2005). Moreover, participants can meet in person at 
the annual international learning forum conferences to share best practices 
and discuss experiences of working with the UNGC or attend global issue-
specific multi-stakeholder dialogues, so-called global “policy dialogues,” to 
discuss contemporary challenges of globalization and corporate responsibil-
ity (Rasche, 2009; Vormedal, 2005). Taken together, we may expect that 
firms that have engaged more with stakeholders in the context of these UNGC 
engagement mechanisms have also learned to better implement the UNGC 
principles compared with firms that exhibit a lower level of engagement.
The annual Global Compact Implementation Survey, the 2011 version 
comprising 1,325 companies from more than 100 countries, suggests a strong 
relationship between the length of UNGC participation and the degree of 
engagement with UNGC stakeholders. “Companies that have been in the 
Global Compact the longest are significantly more likely to partner with the 
UN—60% of early joiners versus 25% of recent joiners” (UNGC, 2012c, 
p. 22). The results of another study suggest “that companies that have partici-
pated many years in the GC, have submitted the most projects and have 
attended the most GC meetings” (Cetindamar & Husoy, 2007, p. 163). With 
regard to learning or implementation progress made by UNGC participants, 
reports by the UNGC (2011b) itself as well as by the consultancy firm 
McKinsey (2007) suggest that learning indeed does occur among UNGC par-
ticipants. However, the responses are not tied to any predefined set of imple-
mentation criteria and results may suffer from several biases, as I will outline 
in the “Data and Method” section.
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Combining (a) the presented arguments on the impact of stakeholder 
engagement on the implementation of the UNGC and (b) the strong relation-
ship between the length of UNGC participation and the likelihood to engage 
and partner with UNGC stakeholders, I hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): The longer a company has been a participant in the 
UNGC, the higher the degree of UNGC implementation.
Learning in the UNGC is not only meant to occur at the global level, but 
also at the local level (Kell & Levin, 2003; Rasche, 2009). Most notably, the 
UNGC supports the proliferation of “local UNGC networks” at the regional 
or country level (Rasche, 2012; Vormedal, 2005). “Their role is to facilitate 
the progress of companies [engaged in the Compact] in implementing the ten 
principles”, while also creating opportunities for multi-stakeholder engage-
ment and collective action (Gilbert & Behnam, 2013, p. 141; see also UNGC, 
2014; Williams, 2004). Some scholars even argue that “membership in the 
GC alone is unlikely to move a company in significant ways toward progres-
sive implementation of the core GC principles,” but that “the existence of 
active regional and local GC networks is a crucial ingredient for setting in 
motion specific mechanisms, such as peer learning and capacity building, 
that can contribute effectively to improved performance of individual mem-
ber companies” (Mwangi et al., 2013, p. 204; see also Gilbert, 2010).
Organizational learning literature defines such a setting where groups of 
legally autonomous organizations engage and cooperate with each other as 
“interorganizational network” (Knight, 2002). Research on the ecology of 
learning organizations (Levitt & March, 1988), interpartner learning in stra-
tegic alliances (Hamel, 1991), and interorganizational learning (Knight, 
2002; Larsson, Bengtsson, Henriksson, & Sparks, 1998) discuss the benefits 
and difficulties of such networks with regard to organizational outcomes. 
Aspects such as power, opportunism, suspicion, and asymmetric learning 
strategies have been identified as barriers to organizational learning in net-
works (Hamel, 1991; Larsson et al., 1998). In contrast, long-term oriented 
networks allowing for dynamic processes and repeated interactions of par-
ticipants over time, as well as high learning stakes and trust, empower inter-
organizational learning processes (Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999; Larsson 
et al., 1998).
We have general indications that certain local networks have been attended 
regularly and that participants perceive the meetings as fruitful thanks to the 
more intense and small-scale interactions that allowed them to learn from one 
another’s experiences (see survey by Vormedal, 2005). This survey thereby 
illustrates (a) the long-term orientation of local UNGC networks allowing for 
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repeated interactions among participants and (b) an intense interaction and 
general positive participant feedback suggesting a general atmosphere of 
transparency and trust instead of opportunism and suspicion. More generally, 
considering that the 10 UNGC principles are not directly tied to the core tasks 
of a business firm (Bromley & Powell, 2012), competitive and opportunistic 
considerations such as exploiting power imbalances or withholding informa-
tion may not play as central a role in voluntary CSR networks. Consequently, 
the benefits of interacting with stakeholders in local UNGC networks seem to 
outweigh potential barriers with respect to achieving organizational learning 
outcomes.
As regards empirical evidence of local UNGC networking, the 2011 
UNGC implementation survey concludes that “[c]ompanies that have partici-
pated in the Global Compact the longest are more likely to engage locally” 
(UNGC, 2012c, p. 25). Yet, we also know that local UNGC networks vary 
significantly as regards annual activities, type of stakeholder inclusion, and 
years of existence if at all established (Rasche, 2012; UNGC, 2010). In line 
with first qualitative empirical analyses (Mwangi et al., 2013) based on two 
local networks, the German and Australian UNGC network, we may expect a 
higher impact of the UNGC on business routines in countries with strong 
UNGC networks. Building on the arguments underlying H1a and having ana-
lyzed the benefits and barriers of interorganizational learning in local UNGC 
networks, I further hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Strong local networks positively affect the rela-
tionship between the duration of UNGC participation and the level of 
UNGC implementation.
Figure 1 illustrates the hypothesized impact of UNGC participation dura-
tion on the level of UNGC implementation (H1a) together with the suggested 
moderating effect of active long-established local networks of this relation-
ship (H1b). Following the CSR literature, this model also includes more gen-
eral determinants of UNGC implementation (control variables; described in 
the “Data and Method” section).
Data and Method
The main data source for this study is the UNGC Business Participant 
Database. My data set comprises all UNGC business participants that sub-
mitted a COP between the introduction of the “Differentiation Programme” 
on February 1, 2011, and November 29, 2011. After merging and eliminating 
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incomplete, duplicate, or otherwise unusable data, the final data set consisted 
of 2,2801 UNGC business participants.
The date of data collection was deliberately chosen, because companies 
can assign themselves the lowest level of UNGC implementation—Learner—
only once and only for the period of 12 months, after which they must either 
proceed to a higher level of implementation or leave the UNGC. This means 
that data on implementation levels collected after February 1, 2012 (i.e., 
more than 12 months after the beginning of the “Differentiation Programme”) 
would suffer from a strong self-selection bias, because companies that classi-
fied as Learner in the first year of the “Differentiation Programme” and did 
not assess any progress in implementation during that year would be excluded 
from the initiative. Recognizing that prior to February 1, 2012, no such for-
mal pressure to make implementation progress in the UNGC existed, the risk 
that my data set suffers significantly from a self-selection bias appears com-
paratively low.
DV
Level of UNGC implementation. The newly introduced UNGC “Differentiation 
Programme” provides, for the first time, a comprehensive measure allowing for 
a differentiated analysis of UNGC implementation levels among participants 
Figure 1. Model of UNGC implementation.
Note. UNGC = UN Global Compact.
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worldwide. The three levels of implementation according to this program are 
“Learner,” “Active,” and “Advanced.” In both the Advanced and the Active 
level (see UNGC, 2012d), it is no longer possible for participants to highlight 
just one issue where implementation is good, while concealing others where 
implementation is poor. Companies have to report on each issue (human rights, 
labor, environment, and anti-corruption) separately. On the Advanced level, 
there are 24 detailed criteria that companies have to meet in their annual COP 
reports. A criterion is considered met when a company communicates that it 
has implemented, or is in the process of implementing, one or more of the com-
monly accepted best practices associated with that criterion (see the online 
appendix). For example, the German MNC Daimler AG—one of the first sig-
natories of the UNGC since its foundation in 2000—assessed its level of 
UNGC implementation in its 2011 COP as Advanced. The COP of the automo-
bile manufacturer fulfills all the 24 Advanced criteria covering all four UNGC 
issues, and even each of the suggested best practices of the criteria addressing 
the UNGC issues: labor, environment, and anti-corruption. As another exam-
ple, the 2011 COP of the French automotive firm Valeo indicates an implemen-
tation of the UNGC at the Learner level. The COP of the UNGC participant 
having joined the initiative in March 2004 does not describe actions or policies 
related to the anti-corruption issue and lacks a CEO statement of continued 
UNGC support; both aspects are mandatory at the Active level.
My analysis based on this three-level measure complements our empirical 
knowledge in two ways. On one hand, while relying on participant declara-
tions—like most, if not all, measures of CSR implementation in large quanti-
tative studies—it avoids asking participants about any type of perceived 
implementation progress as done in other studies. For example, response cat-
egories such as “Advancement would not have happened otherwise” or 
“Significantly helped” (see UNGC, 2012c, p. 10) are not tied to any criteria. 
Therefore, they may be particularly prone to a social desirability bias, that is, 
“systematic error in self-report measures resulting from the desire of respon-
dents to avoid embarrassment and project a favorable image to others” 
(Fisher, 1993, p. 303; see also Crane, 1999). Instead, I derive my conclusions 
on UNGC accomplishments by confronting the self-assessed UNGC imple-
mentation levels with the objectively observable measure “duration” of 
UNGC participation. On the other hand, this assessment is mandatory for 
every participant and as such does not suffer from selection biases within the 
group of UNGC participants. Other sorts of selection biases, that is, selection 
of (longer) UNGC participation, are addressed further down. Furthermore, I 
provide theoretical and empirical analyses allowing for insights on the valid-
ity of this UNGC implementation measure—as regards both its “content” and 
its “construct”—in the online appendix.
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Independent Variables
Duration of UNGC Participation. To analyze the effect of the duration of par-
ticipation on the level of UNGC implementation, I calculated the days 
between the date of UNGC entry and the date of COP submission indicating 
the level of UNGC implementation (DV). I then divided the total days of that 
period by 365 to obtain the effect of duration of participation in years.
Local UNGC network strength (moderating variable). To analyze how local UNGC 
networks influence, that is moderate, the relationship between UNGC participa-
tion duration and the level of UNGC implementation, I first identified several 
criteria that may help indicate the strength of a local network. On one hand, I 
included quantitative criteria: the quantity of network activities in the two years 
([a] 2009 and [b] 2010) prior to the year the UNGC implementation level was 
assessed, and (c) the duration of network establishment in years. On the other 
hand, I considered (d) the quality of a network by assessing whether a “Best 
Practice” was identified in that network according to the UNGC Local Network 
Report referring to data from 2010 (UNGC, 2011a). The type and range of identi-
fied local network best practices corresponds well with previously identified 
mechanisms for stimulating learning among UNGC participants (Kell & Levin, 
2003; Palazzo & Scherer, 2010; Rasche, 2009): The networks of Colombia, Ger-
many, Netherlands, and Vietnam developed practical guides and tools for assess-
ing and improving the organizational implementation of the 10 principles; Serbia 
and Spain focusing exclusively on corruption. UNGC networks of Indonesia, 
Italy, Korea, United Kingdom, Moldova, and Sri Lanka were identified due to 
their collection, publication, and communication of notable examples of other 
UNGC business participants from the same network. Furthermore, UNGC net-
works of Kenya and Paraguay obtained a best practice “distinction” because of 
their in-depth training sessions and workshops aimed at clarifying the 10 UNGC 
principles, reviewing company strategies, and boosting UNGC implementation.
Finally, I contacted a UNGC expert who has worked for and researched on 
the initiative, to provide me with (e) a list of networks that he considers 
“strong.” To demonstrate the robustness of and/or detect potential variations 
in obtained results concerning the local network effect, I constructed a series 
of alternative measures that rely on all the above criteria, a subgroup thereof, 
or single (quantitative vs. qualitative) criteria. The moderator analysis below 
includes a detailed description of the different applied measures and a list of 
countries fulfilling the respective criterion.
Control Variables
According to CSR research, most of the drivers for CSR implementation, or 
UNGC implementation in particular, relate to the visibility and the resources 
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of the firm, as well as the institutional background against which the CSR 
engagement takes place (Campbell, 2007; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). 
Institutional perspectives on CSR suggest that firms form relevant decisions 
by drawing on the prevailing norms and benchmarks that are available in a 
broader social context (Campbell, 2007). To maintain a manageable scope, I 
use these variables as controls without further specifying their potential 
impact on UNGC implementation.
Firm size. The increasing scope and economic interdependence of many cor-
porations, generally resulting in higher visibility of the firms, appears to be 
an important driver for firms to adopt CSR initiatives (Vogel, 2010). Previous 
empirical results suggest that bigger firms are more likely to join the UNGC 
(Bennie, Bernhagen, & Mitchell, 2007); so far there are no results on whether 
they are also better implementers. I used the number of employees as a mea-
sure of firm size. The respective analysis in my sample revealed that the pres-
ence of several very large firms leads to a positively skewed distribution. 
After a natural logarithm (ln) transformation was applied to the number of 
employees, the distribution resembled a normal distribution. Thus, firm size 
is represented here by the ln-transformed number of employees.
Country/region. Certain national institutional conditions, such as strong and 
effectively enforced state regulation as well as the presence of strong trade 
associations or employee associations, promote corporate socially responsi-
ble behavior (Campbell, 2007). To reduce the number of (dummy) variables, 
I grouped countries into regions in many models. If the company is located in 
Western Europe for example, its value is 1 for this region dummy and 0 for 
all others. On the country level, United States of America has been omitted as 
dummy in the analyses and serves as a reference point for a typical liberal 
market economy, to which more coordinated market countries can be com-
pared. On the regional level, Africa constitutes the reference point against 
which other regions can be compared. The regional categorization is based on 
the composition of macro geographical (continental) regions and geographi-
cal sub-regions provided by the UN Statistics Division. In addition, Carib-
bean and Central American companies have been grouped together into 
Central America, whereas the regional dummy MENA represents countries 
in the Middle East and North Africa.
Industrial sector. Considering that the main challenges companies within the 
same industrial sector face are similar, their approaches to CSR may also be 
similar. The boundaries of different industrial sectors can thus be taken to 
represent the boundaries of different institutional fields (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). I grouped the various sectors as presented in the data set obtained 
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from the UNGC into 19 “supersectors,” following the Industry Categoriza-
tion Benchmark (ICB), 2011.
Ownership type. Previous studies on the UNGC (2011b) or CSR in general 
(Atkinson & Galaskiewicz, 1988; Graves & Waddock, 1994; Johnson & 
Greening, 1999) suggest that a company’s ownership structure may be 
another determinant in the adoption of CSR practices. Different types of 
ownership are also related to a firm’s level of visibility and scrutiny, espe-
cially as regards private versus public ownership (Baker, 2010), and may 
therefore influence the degree of UNGC implementation as well. I used four 
different categories of business ownership (public, private, state-owned, sub-
sidiary) as dummy variables in all analyses.
Analytical Approaches
I test my hypotheses across a range of models, that is, ordered logit and probit 
versus ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, incorporating different 
assumptions regarding the underlying distribution and/or nature of the DV. 
First, to closely adhere to the ordinal nature of the DV “UNGC implementa-
tion,” ordered logit and probit models appear most appropriate. These models 
take the ceiling and floor effects into account and avoid potential distortions 
resulting from subjectively assigned scores to the three UNGC differentiation 
levels (Hanushek & Jackson, 1977).
In the ordered logit and probit models, the ordinal DV y is viewed as a 
discrete realization of an underlying latent variable y*, which is unobserv-
able. The categories of variable y are contiguous intervals on the continuous 
scale of variable y*. Whereas the unobservable y* would satisfy the linear 
regression model y*i = x’iβ + ui (x being the covariate vector, β the vector of 
regression coefficients, and u the error term), the observable y is assumed to 
arise from y* as follows: yi = j if αj−1 < y*i ≤ αj (the αs representing unknown 
cutpoints, category boundaries, in the distribution of y*; Lu, 1999). The 
ordered logit and ordered probit models differ in the underlying distribution. 
For the (ordered) logit, the distribution F is the logistic cumulative distribu-
tion function (cdf) F(z) = exp(z)/[1 + exp (z)], whereas for the (ordered) pro-
bit, F is the standard normal cdf (Wooldridge, 2012). My empirical analyses 
revealed that the effects in the ordered logit models are very similar to the 
ones in the ordered probit models. I will only report the results of the latter 
(Table 2, Models 1 to 3, and Table 5) due to their slightly higher predictive 
precision compared with the ordered logit models. To interpret the size of 
effects in ordered probit (and logit) models, we need to look at the marginal 
effects. The following formula outlines the marginal effect of an increase in 
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regressor xr on the probability of falling into category j: ∂pij/∂xri = [F’(αj−1 – 
x’iβ) – F’(αj – x’iβ)]βr. The sum of the marginal effects of each variable on the 
different categories is always zero.
In addition to the ordered probit models, I perform linear (OLS) regression 
analyses (Table 2, Models 4 to 6, and Table 4). This type of analysis allows 
for easier interpretability of the β coefficients. However, as the OLS model 
violates the ordinal-rank assumption of our DV y assuming an interval scale 
instead, results need to be interpreted with caution.
Finally, I controlled for the possibility that participation duration itself is 
nonrandom, that is that firms’ opting (or “selecting”) into participating longer 
in the UNGC as opposed to participating shorter or not at all may be driven 
by omitted variables. This potential selection problem has long been unad-
dressed in empirical work on the UNGC (Berliner & Prakash, 2015). Selection 
effects are present if firms that participate longer in the UNGC have indepen-
dent tendencies toward different aspects in their social performance com-
pared with firms that participate for a shorter period or not at all. I use the 
method of IVs, also referred to as two-stage least squares (2sls) analysis 
(Wooldridge, 2012), in a set of further linear models to solve the potential 
selection—endogeneity—problem, thereby assessing only the exogenous 
element of UNGC participation duration. A valid IV (instrument) is corre-
lated with the potentially endogenous independent variable, but has no partial 
effect on the DV (when the potentially endogenous variable and omitted vari-
ables have been controlled for; Wooldridge, 2012). In other words, the instru-
ment must predict UNGC participation duration of the firms in my data set, 
but must not influence their level of UNGC implementation.
I identify one variable that fulfills these conditions both theoretically and 
empirically: the average participation duration per sector of firms that have 
exited or been delisted from the UNGC. The theoretical intuition behind this 
instrument draws on arguments from the institutional isomorphism and pol-
icy diffusion literatures, stating that organizations tend to mimic the behavior 
of salient peer groups, for example, as regards decisions to participate in 
voluntary initiatives (Berliner & Prakash, 2015; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Simmons, Dobbin, & Garrett, 2006). Recent empirical UNGC literature sug-
gests that a higher number of UNGC participants per sector increases the 
mimetic pressure on other firms in that sector to participate (Berliner & 
Prakash, 2015). Building on this argument, I expect that mimetic pressures 
not only apply for firms’ decision to join but also to stay in the UNGC. That 
is, if firms in a given sector stay longer in voluntary initiatives, other firms in 
that sector may face mimetic pressures to stay longer as well. As the IV must 
only refer to actions of firms other than the reference firms, it only comprises 
former UNGC participants (as of November 29, 2011). Furthermore, 
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considering that reasons for leaving or being excluded from the UNGC 
appear to be so varied (see also Knudsen, 2011), a relation between the par-
ticipation duration of exited participants and the level of UNGC implementa-
tion appears highly unlikely. Empirical tests support the strength of this IV. In 
the applied 2sls model including the IV, the Cragg-Donald F statistic as a test 
for the presence of weak instruments (i.e., that the equation is only weakly 
identified; Stock & Yogo, 2002) is far above a critical value. Running the 
reduced form IV regression, the Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-
ratio test reveals that the instrument is highly relevant; that is, the IV affects 
the level of UNGC implementation through the presumed channel (UNGC 
participation duration).
In addition to these (2sls) IV estimation analyses, I apply yet another 
model addressing selection issues: the classic Heckman selection model 
(Heckman, 1979). This model predicts selection to a potentially endogenous 
treatment (UNGC participation duration) and then controls for unmodeled 
selection to treatment in predicting the DV (UNGC implementation; 
Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010). For this model to work, I 
need to consider both participants and nonparticipants to have nonrandom 
missing data with regard to the DV. As nonparticipants, I included a data set 
of 2,926 delisted UNGC business participants obtained at the same time as 
my main data set used in all other analyses so far (November 29, 2011). The 
total number of observations thereby amounted to 5,187. I controlled for 
unmodeled selection to “treatment” (i.e., UNGC participation duration) in 
predicting the DV by using the same instrument as in the IV model: average 
participation duration per sector of past UNGC business participants. Like 
with the OLS models, caution is necessary when interpreting the results, as 
the IV and Heckman models relax the ordinal-scale assumption of the DV, 
assuming an interval scale instead.
In all analyses, I ensure that standard errors are robust against heteroske-
dasticity (Breusch & Pagan, 1979), that is, that the possible presence of cor-
related or of not normally distributed residuals does not invalidate my 
statistical significance tests. I applied a robust variance estimator, typically 
referred to as Huber–White sandwich estimator (White, 1980), in all models. 
Models 2, 4, and 6 include the “strong local network” variable.
Results
Descriptive Observations
As displayed in part (a) of Table 1, almost a quarter (23%) of UNGC business 
participants implements the UNGC at the Learner level, the vast majority 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
(a) Tabulation of frequencies per level of UNGC implementation
Level of UNGC 
implementation Frequency % Cumulated
Learner 663 23.62 23.62
Active 1,985 70.72 94.34
Advanced 159 5.66 100.00
Total 2,807 100.00  
(b) Correlation matrix
 i ii iii iv v vi vii viii
i.  UNGC 
implementation
1.000  
ii.  Duration of 
participation
.151 1.000  
Local network strengtha
iii.  Index 3 .055 .077 1.000  
iv. Index 5 .040 .093 .897 1.000  
v.  Number of 
activities (in 2010)
−.012 .071 .702 .713 1.000  
vi.  Best practice (in 
2010)
.024 −.002 .219 .067 −.220 1.000  
vii.  Instrumental 
variableb
.014 .164 −.020 −.004 .000 .027 1.000  
viii.  Employees (ln) .227 .407 .015 −.009 .045 .070 .037 1.000
Note. Control variables (region, industrial sector, ownership type) not reported here.  
UNGC = UN Global Compact.
aSee legends of Table 4 for detailed descriptions of the different local network strength 
measures.
bAverage UNGC participation duration per sector of delisted firms.
(71%) reports to be at the Active level, whereas only a very small percentage 
(6%) declares an implementation of the UNGC at the Advanced level.
Table 1, part (b), is a correlation matrix for key variables included in this 
study.
Testing H1a
Models 1 to 6 displayed in Table 2 report the effect of the duration of partici-
pation on the—self-assessed—level of UNGC implementation. Models 1 to 
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Table 2. Results of Ordered (Probit) and Linear (OLS) Regression Analyses.














0.034** 0.037*** 0.051*** 0.013** 0.014** 0.018***
Size (employees, ln) 0.086*** 0.087*** 0.106*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.037***
Region (“Africa” omitted); country (“USA” omitted)a
 Asia −0.124 −0.043  
  Japan 0.401* 0.127*
  Jordan 0.732* 0.245
  Kazakhstan 0.750*** 0.254**
 Central America −0.097 −0.028  
 Eastern Europe −0.207 −0.078  
  Serbia −0.855* −0.329*
  Slovakia 0.407* 0.130
 Latin America −0.105 −0.037  
  Ecuador 1.222* 0.403*
  Peru 0.389* 0.129*
 MENA 0.379* 0.149*  
  Syrian Arab Republic 0.934*** 0.319***
  Turkey 0.485* 0.166*
  United Arab 
Emirates
0.764*** 0.257***
 North America −0.087 −0.027  
 Oceania −0.183 −0.063  
 Western Europe −0.005 0.001  
  France −0.781*** −0.310***
  Italy 0.631** 0.218*
  Luxembourg 1.152* 0.396
  Spain 0.814*** 0.274***
Industrial sector (“Automobiles and parts” omitted)b
 Banks 0.474* 0.502* 0.366 0.181* 0.190* 0.124
 Construction and 
materials
0.429* 0.456* 0.330 0.169* 0.178* 0.116
 Utilities 0.600** 0.658** 0.704** 0.228** 0.248** 0.236**
Ownership type (“private company” omitted)
 Public company 0.186* 0.191* 0.204* 0.073** 0.075** 0.073*
 State-owned company−0.059 −0.047 −0.060 −0.021 −0.016 −0.018
 Subsidiary 0.216 0.260* 0.276* 0.085 0.102* 0.103*
Intercept cut1 0.099 0.097 0.314  
Intercept cut2 2.588*** 2.601*** 3.044***  
Constant 1.490*** 1.487*** 1.426***
R2 .073 .077 .156
(continued)
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Ordered probit (and logit) model marginal effects and predicted probabilities
Dependent variable
Ordered probit marginal effectsc 
for UNGC implementation level
Ordered logit marginal effectsc 
for UNGC implementation level
Learner Active Advanced Learner Active Advanced
Duration of 
participation
−.014*** .010*** .004*** −.013*** .010*** .003***
Employees (ln) −.028*** .020*** .008*** −.026*** .020*** .007***
Further controls (country, industrial sector, ownership type) not reported here
Predicted probabilitiesd 21.967 71.842 6.191 21.887 71.858 6.255
Actual frequenciesd 23.620 70.716 5.664 23.620 70.716 5.664
Note. N = 2,280 (for all models). All coefficients are standardized β coefficients. OLS = ordinary least 
squares; UNGC = UN Global Compact; MENA = Middle East and North Africa.
aOnly significant results with N > 3 in at least one model reported.
bOnly significant results reported.
cMarginal effects predicted at mean: Duration of participation = 3.843, employees (ln) = 6.895.
dIn %.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Table 2. (continued)
3 report the results of ordered probit regressions, Models 4 to 6 those of OLS 
regressions. While all six models control for firm size, industrial sector, and 
ownership type, they vary with regard to the consideration of geographic 
influences. Models 1 and 4 report the effect of UNGC participation duration 
across regional or country influences, whereas Models 2 and 5 (3 and 6) 
reflect the UNGC participation duration effect within regions (countries). Put 
differently, the models controlling for region (country) influences solely 
reflect the differences in implementation between younger and older partici-
pants within each region (country).
In all these models, “duration of participation” significantly and positively 
affects the “level of UNGC implementation.” Although appearing rather 
small in all models, this effect slightly increases when controlling for regional 
influences in Models 2 and 5, and for country influences in Models 3 and 6 
compared with the effect across countries or regions (Models 1 and 4). 
Recalling that the β coefficients in the ordered probit regressions (Models 1 
to 3) do not show the actual size of the effect, I further analyze the marginal 
effects in such models as depicted in Table 2. For example, we can see in the 
ordered probit model controlling for country influences that with each addi-
tional year of UNGC participation (centered at mean 3.843), the probability 
for a business participant classifying as Learner decreases by 1.4%, whereas 
the probabilities of classifying as Active or Advanced increase by 1.0% and 
0.4% respectively.
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Finally, the OLS model provides further indication that the size of the 
UNGC participation duration effect is rather small (β ranging between .013 
[p < .001] in Model 4 and .018 [p < .001] in Model 6). We have to recall that 
the participation duration effect only reflects the “net” impact of the length of 
UNGC participation, that is, it excludes learning effects from sources outside 
the Global Compact. Moreover, the underlying data are cross-sectional and 
do not trace implementation levels over time. However, by restricting our 
analysis on time-period subsamples of our data set (not reported in a separate 
table due to constraints in scope), we can get a more detailed picture on the 
robustness or variability of the UNGC participation duration effect. To 
acknowledge for arguments stating that it might have been mainly industry 
leaders that joined the UNGC in the first place (Mwangi et al., 2013, p. 211), 
I first exclude companies having joined in 2000, the year of UNGC founda-
tion. Rerunning the analysis performed in Model 6 now with this restricted 
participant base, the UNGC participation duration effect maintains its size 
and high significance (β = .018 [p < .001] same as in full sample, Model 6, at 
three decimal places), which speaks against the presence of a strong “first-
joiner effect.”
Furthermore, restricting our analysis on the time period since the intro-
duction of the two UNGC governance reforms in 2003 and 2005, the first 
introducing the COP policy and the latter formally classifying companies as 
“non-communicating” or “inactive” in case of noncompliance with the COP 
policy (Mwangi et al., 2013, p. 207), reveals additional interesting insights. 
Indeed, the size of the UNGC participation duration effect increases to 
β = .019 [p < .001] for the subsample including participants since 2003, and 
even further to β = .026 [p < .001] for the subsample of participants since 
2005. In both cases, the effect remains highly significant. Finally, restricting 
our analysis solely on the period around the introduction of the “Differentiation 
Programme” (official introduction in 2011, but basic self-assessment of the 
coverage of all four UNGC issue areas in place already in 2010) yields insig-
nificant results, whereas the direction of the effect seems to point into a 
surprising direction. The size of the participation duration effect decreases to 
almost zero when looking only at participants having joined the UNGC 
since 2009 (β = .003), and even becomes negative for the period since 2010 
(β = −.041), respectively, 2011 being the most recent year considered in this 
study.
A locally weighted regression analysis, so-called “lowess smoothing” (see 
Cleveland, 1979), of duration of participation on UNGC implementation 
(Figure 2) illustrates that a “progressive implementation” effect seems to be 
present especially for the sample of companies having joined prior to 2010, 
that is, being participants for more than 2 years. However, Figure 2 also 
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illustrates the previously identified negligent or even (insignificant) negative 
participation duration effect for the sample of companies having joined since 
2010, the last 2 years considered in this study.
Finally, the results of the IV models, solving the potential selection effect of 
UNGC participation duration in the UNGC by assessing only its exogenous com-
ponent, are presented in Table 3. The four IV model specifications controlling for 
country influences all yield positive and significant effects for UNGC participa-
tion duration on UNGC implementation. In the 2sls regression (Model 2), this 
effect is even larger (β = .061 [p < .1]) compared with the corresponding OLS 
regression without the IV (Model 6 in Table 2). In all three Heckman models, the 
size of the participation duration (β = .017-.018 [ps < .001]) effect remains simi-
lar to the OLS models in Table 2, and is still highly significant. Models 3 and 4 
use maximum likelihood, Model 5 two-step estimation, Model 3 only includes 
the IV in the selection equation, and Models 4 and 5 include the variables partici-
pation duration, country, and supersector as well (excluding “ownership type” 
due to missing data in the data set of past UNGC participants). However, when 
controlling for geographic influences at the regional level (Model 2), the partici-
pation duration effect (β = . 052) becomes insignificant (p = .157, SE = 0.037). 
Finally, the selection equations (not reported in Table 3) reveal a highly signifi-
cant effect of the IV on the likelihood of the DV being observed.
Figure 2. Level of UNGC differentiation by duration of UNGC participation.
Note. UNGC = UN Global Compact.
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Table 3. IV Analyses.
Level of UNGC 
implementation











Duration of participation .052 .061† .017*** .018*** .018***
Size (employees, ln) .020 .022† .037*** .037*** .037***
Region (“Africa” omitted); country (“USA” omitted)c
 Asia −.041  
  India −.197† −.107 −.108 −.108
  Indonesia −.326* −.287* −.318* −.334**
  Japan .151* .128† .191* .224*
  Jordan .253* .244 .291 .315
  Kazakhstan .253** .248 .306 .334
  Philippines −.780* −.537* −.630* −.679*
 Central America −.058  
 Eastern Europe −.084  
  Russian Federation −.533† −.569** −.593** −.606***
  Serbia −.327* −.324* −.282† −.258
 Latin America −.049  
  Ecuador .376† .405† .436* .454*
 MENA .185*  
  Syrian Arab Republic .338*** .319** .385** .421**
  Turkey .182* .165* .158* .155†
  United Arab 
Emirates
.288*** .260 .272 .279
 North America −.016  
 Oceania −.049  
 Western Europe −.007  
  Denmark .116† .105† .149* .173*
  France −.357*** −.310*** −.307*** −.305***
  Italy .188* .217** .206* .200*
  Luxembourg .463** .395 .433 .453†
  Spain .232*** .274*** .284*** .289***
Industrial sector (automobiles and parts omitted)
 Banks .296* .238† .137 .177 .205†
 Construction and 
materials
.228* .170† .116 .117 .118
 Health care .189† .171† .118 .139† .147†
 Utilities .251** .237** .237** .272*** .289***
Ownership type (“private company” omitted)
 Public company .033 .026 .073** .073** .073**
(continued)
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Level of UNGC 
implementation











 State-owned company .014 −.001 −.016 −.016 −.014
 Subsidiary .111* .107* .103* .103* .104*
R2 .043 .116  
Athrho constant .172 .156  
Lnsigma constant −.780*** −.784***  
Mills lambda .108
N 2,261 2,261 5,187 5,187 5,187
Note. All coefficients are standardized β coefficients. IV = instrumental variable; 2SLS = 
two-stage least squares; MENA = Middle East and North Africa; ML = maximum likelihood; 
UNGC = UN Global Compact.
aOnly IV (average participation duration per sector of delisted firms) in selection equation.
bIV and control variables (duration of participation, country, industrial sector) in selection 
equation.
cOnly significant results at *p < .05 (or higher) with N > 3 in at least two models reported.
†p < .1. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Table 3. (continued)
Overall, the findings across the great majority of analytical approaches 
and model specifications ascertain a significant positive effect of UNGC par-
ticipation duration on UNGC implementation, and thus provide support for 
H1a.
Testing H1b
The results in Tables 4 and 5 provide detailed and partially surprising results 
on the role of local UNGC networks strength in the relationship between the 
duration of UNGC participation and the level of UNGC implementation. 
Models in Table 4 are based on linear (OLS) regression to provide a first 
overview of significant results across a wide range of local network strength 
measures. In Table 5, I then ran ordered probit analyses for the more relevant 
network measures identified in Table 4. This allows us to gain detailed 
insights into the marginal effects regarding the likelihood of implementing 
the UNGC at a particular level (Learner, Active, or Advanced) as reported in 
the bottom part of Table 5.
It is to note that there are two related effects of a third variable on the 
relationship between an independent variable and a DV—the one of a mod-




Table 4. Moderator Analyses of Local Network Strength—Linear (OLS) Models.
Local network 
strength
OLS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Geography control variables No Region Country No Region Country
Composite measures
 Activities and best 
practicea
Duration of participation .0107* .0123** .0178*** .00607 .00816† .0142**
Moderator .193*** .243*** .0870 .120*** .177*** .0489
Interaction .0208* .0184* .0146†
 Index 3b Duration of participation .0120** .0131** .0178*** .00188 .00499 .0127*
Moderator .0648* .0912** −.329* −.0163 .0271 −.363*
Interaction .0254* .0200* .0120
 Index 5c Duration of participation .0120** .0131** .0178*** .00110 .00403 .00938
Moderator .0556† .0725† .272* −.0227 .00532 .216
Interaction .0232* .0192† .0171 (p = .116)
Quantitative measures
 Number of 
activities (in 2010)
Duration of participation .0132** .0141*** .0178*** .0178** .0190** .0242**
Moderator −.00040 −.00052 .00128* .00037 .00014 .00238*
Interaction −.00038 −.00027 −.00065
 Activities × Yearsd Duration of participation .0130** .0139** .0178*** .0113 .0148† .0142
Moderator −.00002 −.00004 .00025* .00033 .00024 .00146***







OLS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Geography control variables No Region Country No Region Country
Qualitative measure
 Best practicee Duration of participation .0130** .0139** .0178*** .00821† .00954* .0140**
Moderator .00908 .0101 .0870 −.0959* −.0854* .0242
Interaction .0317** .0288* .0245*
Note. N = 2,280 (for all six models). All coefficients are standardized β coefficients. All models control for firm size, industrial sector, and ownership 
type (not reported here). OLS = ordinary least squares; UNGC = UN Global Compact.
aLocal networks with above average number of activities in 2009 or 2010 and a best practice in 2010 (Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Paraguay, Serbia).
bIndex with three equally weighted criteria: above average number of activities in 2009 (Argentina, Belarus, Bulgaria, China, France, Georgia, Italy, 
Japan, Serbia, Spain, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom), above average number of activities in 2010 (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, France, Germany, 
India, Italy, Japan, Paraguay, Russian Federation, Serbia, Spain, Ukraine), best practice; standardized (0-1).
cIndex with five equally weighted criteria: above average number of activities in 2009, above average number of activities in 2010, best practice: 
established at least since 2004 (Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Iceland, Italy, India, Macedonia, Spain, 
Japan, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nepal, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom), strong 
local networks as identified by UNGC expert (Argentina, Germany, France, Spain, Nordic, that is, Denmark, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, 
Sweden); standardized (0-1).
dAverage number of activities in 2009 and 2010 × Years of existence.
eBest practice identified in UNGC Local Network Report referring to data of 2010 (Colombia, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, Republic of Korea, 
Moldova, Namibia, Netherlands, Paraguay, Serbia, Spain, Sri Lanka, United Kingdom, Vietnam).





Table 5. Moderator Analyses of Local Network Strength–Ordered Probit Models.
Local network strength
Ordered probit Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Geography control 
variables No Region Country No Region Country
Composite measures
 Activities and best practicea Duration of 
participation
0.0290** 0.0334** 0.0515*** 0.0171 0.0226† 0.0410**
Moderator 0.507*** 0.625*** −0.166 0.309*** 0.447*** −0.341
Interaction 0.0554* 0.0497* 0.0432†
 Index 3b Duration of 
participation
0.0317** 0.0345** 0.0515*** 0.00560 0.0136 0.0376*
Moderator 0.174* 0.240** −0.869 −0.0369 0.0723 −0.999
Interaction 0.0656** 0.0522* 0.0330
 Index 5c Duration of 
participation
0.0315** 0.0345** 0.0515*** 0.00376 0.0113 0.0283
Moderator 0.152* 0.194† −1.449 −0.0493 0.0218 −1.752
Interaction 0.0593* 0.0494† 0.0473 (p = .110)
Qualitative measure
 Best practiced Duration of 
participation
0.0343** 0.0369*** 0.0515*** 0.0223† 0.0260* 0.0408**
Moderator 0.0242 0.0267 −0.290 −0.243* −0.216* −0.384





Ordered probit marginal effects
Dependent variable
Ordered probit marginal effects for UNGC 
implementation level
Ordered probit marginal effects  
for UNGC implementation level
Learner Active Advanced Learner Active Advanced
Geography control Region Region Region Country Country Country
Composite measures
 Duration of participation −.006† .004† .002† −.011*** .008*** .003***
 Activities and best practicea −.124*** .082*** .041*** .090 −.065 −.026
 Interaction −.014* .009* .005* −.011† .008† .003†
 Duration of participation −.004 .003 .001 −.010* .007* .003*
 Index 3b −.020 .013 .007 .265 −.189 −.075
 Interaction −.015 .010 .005 −.009 .006 .002
 Duration of participation −.003 .002 .001 −.008 (p = .145) .005 (p = .145) .002 (p = .149)
 Index 5c −.006 .004 .002 .464 −.332 −.132
 Interaction −.014† .009† .005† −.013 (p = 0.111) .009 (p = .111) .004 (p = .113)
Qualitative measure
 Duration of participation −.007* .005* .003* −.011*** .008*** .003***
 Best practiced .061* −.040* −.021* .102 −.073 −.029
 Interaction −.020* .013* .007* −.018* .013* .005*
Note. N = 2,280 (for all models). All coefficients are standardized β coefficients. All models control for firm size, industrial sector and ownership type (not reported here).
aLocal networks with above average number of activities in 2009 or 2010 and a best practice in 2010 (Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany, Paraguay, Serbia).
bIndex with three equally weighted criteria: above average number of activities in 2009 (Argentina, Belarus, Bulgaria, China, France, Georgia, Italy, Japan, Serbia, Spain, 
Ukraine, and the United Kingdom), above average number of activities in 2010 (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Paraguay, Russian 
Federation, Serbia, Spain, Ukraine), best practice; standardized (0-1).
cIndex with five equally weighted criteria: above average number of activities in 2009, above average number of activities in 2010, best practice: established at least since 
2004 (Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Iceland, Italy, India, Macedonia, Spain, Japan, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Nepal, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom), strong local networks as identified by UNGC expert (Argentina, Germany, 
France, Spain, Nordic, that is, Denmark, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden); standardized (0-1).
dBest practice identified in UNGC Local Network Report referring to data of 2010 (Colombia, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Moldova, Namibia, 
Netherlands, Paraguay, Serbia, Spain, Sri Lanka, United Kingdom, Vietnam).
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Table 5. (continued)
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exclusively on the moderator analysis for two reasons. First, whereas media-
tors explain more generally how or why a certain effect between two vari-
ables occurs, moderators specify when (i.e., under which conditions) certain 
effects will hold (R. M. Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 1176). The latter seems to 
respond more directly to this study’s key mission to assess the impact of the 
UNGC and the effectiveness of certain UNGC learning mechanisms. Second, 
a mediator analysis assumes that the key independent variable (UNGC par-
ticipation duration) is causally antecedent to the intervening variable (local 
network strength; R. M. Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 1174). This would neglect 
the similarly plausible assumption that strong local UNGC networks may 
also affect the duration of UNGC participation. The moderator analysis 
avoids such restricting assumptions between the two variables, and puts them 
instead at the same level in regard to their relation with the DV (level of 
UNGC implementation).
To test for moderation, in addition to regressing the independent variable 
on the DV (see Table 2), the moderator variable (local network strength) is 
included in the regression (Tables 4 and 5, Models 1-3). Finally, an interac-
tion of the independent and moderator variable is added to the regression 
(Tables 4 and 5, Models 4-6). The interaction effect is most easily interpre-
table when the moderator is a dichotomous (0/1) variable (first and last local 
network strength measure in Tables 4 and 5). In this case, the interaction 
coefficient directly reports the additional effect of participation duration on 
level of UNGC implementation for participants from strong local network 
countries compared with the remaining countries (see Table 4 and ordered 
probit marginal effects in Table 5). In contrast, if the moderator is a continu-
ous variable (other local network measures in Tables 4 and 5), the interpreta-
tion of the moderator effect is less obvious and requires caution, as we would 
have to take into account “a priori how the effect of the independent variable 
varies as a function of the moderator” (see R. M. Baron & Kenny, 1986, 
p. 1175).
In both the OLS and ordered probit models, the composite measures of 
local network strength in the regressions without the interaction term (Models 
1-3 of Tables 4 and 5) almost unequivocally suggest that strong local net-
works—as well as participation duration—have a positive effect on the level 
of UNGC implementation (β ranging between .0556 [p < .1] and .243 [p < 
.001] in the OLS and between .194 [p < .1] and .625 [p < .001] in the ordered 
probit Models 1 and 2). Only when including country controls, which may 
lead to various dependencies with the local network measures explained 
above, the local network effect becomes ambiguous (Model 3 of Tables 4 and 
5). Now including the interaction term, Models 4 to 6 reveal that the compos-
ite local network measures not only have a positive effect on the level of 
Schembera 813
UNGC implementation but also that this strong local network effect is stron-
ger for older business participants compared with newer ones from the 
remaining countries: β ranges between .0184 [p < .05] and .0254 [p < .05] in 
the OLS and between .0494 [p < .1] and .0656 [p < .01] in the ordered probit 
Models 4 and 5. More precisely, the ordered probit marginal effects analysis 
suggests that older participants from strong local networks are about 1.4% 
less likely to classify as Learner, and instead 0.9% (0.5%) more likely to clas-
sify as Active (Advanced); note that effects are not always significant across 
the different network measures and slightly smaller when controlling for 
country instead of regional influences (see composite measures in Table 5). 
Although the results of Model 6 tend to support the previous findings 
(although effects are not always significant), again these regressions includ-
ing country controls need to be interpreted with caution.
Finally, an analysis of single criteria for measuring local network strength 
reveals even more detailed insights: Most of the moderator and interaction 
coefficients capturing quantitative aspects of local networks are insignifi-
cant. Only Models 3 and 6 (Table 4) controlling for country influences 
(potentially inheriting unobservable interdependencies with the moderator) 
report a significant positive moderator effect as found in previous regres-
sions. However, looking at the key qualitative aspect of assessing local net-
work strength, that is best practices by local networks, reveals further and 
partially surprising insights: The effect of this variable is only significant 
when taking into account the participation duration of its business members. 
More precisely, this qualitative “Best Practice” local networks measure does 
not have a significant effect across all (new and old) UNGC participants in 
the countries of these networks. In contrast, the interaction terms—ranging 
between .0245 [p < .05] and .0317 [p < .01] in the OLS case and between 
.0674 [p < .05] and .0795 [p < .01] in the ordered probit case—suggest that 
these “Best Practice” networks only affect the level of UNGC implementa-
tion over the duration of participation. In other words, this measure pre-
dominantly stimulates the UNGC implementation of the older participants. 
A look into the marginal effects of the ordered probit models (Table 5) speci-
fies that older participants from countries with high quality networks are 
1.3% or 0.7% more likely to implement the UNGC at the Active or Advanced 
level, respectively, compared with newer participants from the remaining 
countries.
Overall, the results stemming from multiple measures of local network 
strength and different analytical approaches provide detailed evidence for the 
influential moderating role of local network strength in the relationship 
between participation duration and level of UNGC implementation, thus 
lending support for H1b.
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Discussion and Conclusion
This study focuses on the largest voluntary CSR initiative worldwide, the 
UNGC. Its purpose is to enrich our knowledge of the impact of such initiative 
on the business participants’ implementation of the initiative’s principles. 
Consequently, this study addresses the following research question: Does 
longer UNGC participation duration lead to higher levels of UNGC imple-
mentation? As outlined below, my findings contribute not only to the litera-
tures on the UNGC and voluntary CSR initiatives in general, but also enrich 
our knowledge on learning in and by interorganizational networks over time. 
In addition, I provide theoretical and empirical insights on the validity of the 
new “Differentiation Programme” measure.
UNGC Participation Duration
Although critics have strongly questioned that voluntary CSR initiatives such 
as the UNGC are able to induce their signatory companies to enhance their 
CSR efforts (Behnam & MacLean, 2011; Deva, 2006; Sethi & Schepers, 
2014), my findings suggest that such initiatives may indeed impact organiza-
tional practices. Overall, I found the level of UNGC implementation to be 
higher for longer UNGC participants than for newer ones. This suggests that 
UNGC participation duration has a positive, albeit moderate, effect on the 
level of UNGC implementation. The present study thereby contributes to the 
few existing quantitative studies about the impact of the UNGC over the time 
of participation (Berliner & Prakash, 2015; McKinsey, 2007; UNGC, 2011b). 
It adds to the study of Berliner and Prakash (2015), which suggests that CSR 
ratings of UNGC participants increase over time. Whereas their study is 
based on U.S. firms and focuses on environmental and human rights issues 
exclusively, this study extends our knowledge by looking at business partici-
pants worldwide and the whole set of UNGC principles. Furthermore, this 
study adds to practitioner studies, which had to rely on non-criteria-based 
perceptions. In the 2010 UNGC implementation survey, only 16% (5%) of 
the business participant respondents stated that the UNGC has a minimal (no) 
impact on CSR policies and practices. The vast majority (79%), however, 
assessed at least a moderate impact on such behavior (UNGC, 2011b, p. 16). 
The UNGC study by McKinsey (2007, p. 18) reported similar findings: 59% 
of respondents, which were CEOs of companies participating in the Global 
Compact, replied that they had incorporated environmental, social, and gov-
ernance issues into core strategy “much more” than 5 years ago.
Here, I assess the “net” impact of UNGC participation focusing on the 
UNGC learning and networking mechanisms exclusively available to UNGC 
Schembera 815
participants by drawing upon the objectively observable measure duration of 
participation. My findings across all different types and specifications of ana-
lytical models, including IV approaches, suggest that the duration of UNGC 
participation has a much lower impact on the level of UNGC implementation 
(marginal effects in the ordered logit and probit models around 1%; OLS 
coefficient β < .02) than the McKinsey (2007) study and the UNGC (2011b) 
implementation survey suggest. In this respect, we may need to scale down 
the very optimistic expectations regarding the UNGC’s impact on its busi-
ness participants’ CSR-related behavior that appear in previous studies. To 
obtain a better picture on the UNGC “net” impact in future surveys, the 
UNGC could add questions controlling for the impact of other CSR initia-
tives (Rasche et al., 2013).
Moreover, my findings provide additional insights on the effect of “first 
joiners” as well as the various governance reforms by looking at time-period 
subsamples. On one hand, the UNGC participation duration effect remains 
unchanged when controlling for the argument that industry leaders are par-
ticularly likely to join the UNGC in the first place (Mwangi et al., 2013). On 
the other hand, this effect becomes larger when restricting the analysis to the 
time period since the refinement of the UNGC accountability structure 
through the 2003 introduction of the COP policy and 2005 introduction of 
“company delistings” (Mwangi et al., 2013). This finding provides initial 
evidence that these reforms further increased the impact of the UNGC on its 
business participants, and allows first inferences on the conditions under 
which refined accountability structures in voluntary CSR programs can 
achieve intended ends (Behnam & MacLean, 2011; Berliner & Prakash, 
2015). Several studies about the essence and design of global voluntary CSR 
initiatives tended to restrict their analysis to a static perspective, that is, they 
focused on the accountability and performance-related aspects of a standard 
at a given point in time.
Such a perspective led Deva (2006) to criticize the UNGC principles as 
being too vague and thus hard to implement, or Behnam and MacLean (2011) 
to conclude that the UNGC invites participants to decouple actual practices 
from formal principles. This understanding may focus too much on the per-
formance of standards, for example, by comparing nonadopters with adopters 
(often neglecting the duration of participation; King & Toffel, 2007; Wijen, 
2014). According to this view, standards “need to be designed and imple-
mented in such a way that adopters will substantively comply with standard 
requirements” (Wijen, 2014, p. 306; D. P. Baron & Lyon, 2012; Campbell, 
2007; King & McDonnel, 2012). In contrast, this study suggests that volun-
tary global standards may have a much more developmental character than 
critics applying a static performance perspective on standards suggest. Only 
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once the UNGC has existed for several years, has expanded its range of CSR 
issues, and has gathered a substantial participant base, the UNGC gradually 
refined its accountability mechanisms, which then—under these particular 
conditions—has further increased its impact on participants. In sum, it 
appears reasonable to conclude that implementation criteria and exact goals 
do not have to be fully defined ex ante yet may be continuously adjusted and 
refined along the way (Haack, Schoeneborn, & Wickert, 2012; Schembera, 
Haack, & Scherer, 2015).
Strong Local UNGC Networks
The above analysis lent general support to arguments of learning and stake-
holder engagement effects across local UNGC networks (Burnes, 2004; 
Campbell, 2007; Kell & Levin, 2003). Results from moderator analyses pro-
vided more comprehensive insights on the role of strong local UNGC net-
works. Applying composite quantitative and qualitative measures of local 
network strengths, the presence of strong local UNGC networks has a signifi-
cant positive effect on the level of UNGC implementation across all business 
participants in these countries, regardless of their duration of participation, 
which is in line with previous theoretical arguments (Mwangi et al., 2013; 
Rasche, 2012; Vormedal, 2005). However, a progressive effect on the level of 
UNGC implementation over the duration of participation is only present 
when applying a local network measure that focuses on the quality rather 
than quantity of network activities.
These differential insights contribute importantly to recent UNGC studies 
that have distinguished between costly and more superficial activities 
(Berliner & Prakash, 2015), assuming that time is closely related to costs. 
Whereas Berliner and Prakash (2015) found that UNGC participants fare 
worse than nonparticipants on costly performance dimensions, the results of 
this study specify that the type of activities pursued by a certain UNGC net-
work may influence whether its business participants take into account more 
costly, time-consuming activities. The results suggesting that local networks 
focusing on a large quantity of activities do not affect older participants in a 
significantly different manner compared with newer ones may imply that 
many business participants in the countries of these local networks focus on 
assessment criteria of UNGC implementation that can be implemented in a 
short period of time. Conversely, we may conclude from the fact that local 
networks known for best practices, high quality activities, affect older partici-
pants significantly more than newer ones, that business participants in those 
countries also take into account more time-consuming, or costly/substantial, 
criteria. These findings also contribute to the interorganizational network 
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literature, which has suggested positive effects in networks with long-term 
orientation and high learning stakes (Crossan et al., 1999; Larsson et al., 
1998), arguably more likely to be present in high quality local networks. 
However, findings derived from high quantity local networks may point 
toward existing learning barriers such as opportunism and/or asymmetry in 
learning activities (Hamel, 1991; Larsson et al., 1998).
Future studies on voluntary CSR initiatives should further investigate the 
relationship and dynamics of learning in and by interorganizational networks 
(Knight, 2002) to shed light on the interaction of network activity and quality 
on one hand, and the type of implemented UNGC practices of business par-
ticipants on the other. For example, future studies may categorize the 
Advanced criteria of UNGC implementation depending on the expected cost 
needed to implement the criteria and analyze the determinant of each cate-
gory. Furthermore, future research should study dynamic processes at net-
works over time, scrutinizing whether learning not only occurs at the level of 
the organization but also of the network as a whole (Knight, 2002; Larsson 
et al., 1998). For example, a focus can be put on the suggested necessity of 
achieving a “critical mass” of participants to promote global CSR practices 
(Barkemeyer & Napolitano, 2009; Haack et al., 2012; Kell, 2005). This may 
reveal whether voluntary CSR initiatives first need to be concerned with 
building up a large group of participants by keeping the implementation cri-
teria low, and only thereafter a tightening of criteria and progress among 
participants can be expected (Christensen, Morsing, & Thyssen, 2013; Haack 
et al., 2012).
With regard to mechanisms of UNGC implementation, we should recall 
that this study’s focus is on learning and networking mechanisms allowing us 
to get insights into the “net” impact of the UNGC. A variety of other CSR 
implementation mechanisms may exist. To a certain extent, learning and net-
working mechanisms may also lead to increased prioritization by top man-
agement, for example, if the firm commitment during these stakeholder 
sessions generates heightened societal expectations and pressure (see Haack 
et al., 2012). However, future studies may investigate more thoroughly how 
societal pressure, for example, intense media exposure (Wartick, 1992), 
influences a firm’s level of UNGC implementation. Even more, a number of 
mechanisms driving the level of UNGC implementation may exist that are 
fully unrelated to the UNGC’s learning and networking approach and were 
hence excluded in this study. Most notably, firm-specific critical events such 
as ethical transgressions have been identified as important drivers for CSR 
implementation (Chandler, 2014; Gebhardt & Müller-Seitz, 2011). In addi-
tion, a firm’s participation in other CSR initiatives, or global CSR trends in 
general, can influence the level of UNGC implementation (see also Potoski 
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& Prakash, 2005, p. 247). For this study’s purpose, I assume that such exter-
nal mechanisms affect younger and older UNGC participants similarly, while 
statistical controls (country/region, industrial sector) may also partly address 
these concerns. However, longitudinal future research may try to fully take 
into account the possibility that older UNGC participants are also substan-
tially more likely to be member of other CSR initiatives compared with 
younger UNGC participants through a mix of qualitative and quantitative 
analyses (see Rasche et al., 2013, p. 22). Finally, future research may also 
consider to what extent the UNGC could impact businesses even beyond its 
participant base, for example, when professional CSR consultants use the 
UNGC as a template for their company-tailored advice.
The New “Differentiation Programme”
I discussed the validity of the UNGC “Differentiation Programme” by con-
sulting academic assessment models (Baumann-Pauly & Scherer, 2013; 
Behnam & MacLean, 2011) as well as empirical data on sustainability com-
piled by independent third parties (RobeccoSAM and BHP Brugger und 
Partners). As regards content, the UNGC “Differentiation Programme” 
displays—in most regards—a good fit with the academic corporate citizen-
ship assessment tool of Baumann-Pauly and Scherer (2013). However, my 
analysis revealed certain “loopholes” in the former, namely an insufficient 
integration of three central elements of UNGC implementation: “alignment of 
incentive structures,” “provision of training,” and “installation of a complaints 
procedure.” To further increase the impact of the initiative, these “loopholes” 
should be closed by obliging participants aiming for the GC Advanced level to 
incorporate these three CSR elements in all four UNGC issue areas.
Regarding the risk of bluewashing (or decoupling) in the UNGC, recent 
developments such as the introduction of the “Differentiation Programme” or 
public “delistings” as part of the COP policy constitute improvements of the 
UNGC’s accountability structure and suggest an updated analysis of the for-
mer application of decoupling characteristics to the UNGC by Behnam and 
MacLean (2011). Furthermore, comparisons of the self-assessed UNGC data 
with third-party assessments did not indicate that the findings in this study 
might be crucially distorted by the presence of “decoupling” or social desir-
ability bias.
Finally, the finding that participants having joined the UNGC since the 
launch of the Differentiation Programme around 2010/2011 display slightly 
higher levels of UNGC implementation compared with firms having joined 
shortly before its launch (see Figure 2) calls for further investigations. Future 
research may examine whether this program has led to shifting motivations 
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for UNGC participation and assess implementation progress, for example, 
from Active to Advanced, over time. Arguably, the opportunity to select an 
Advanced level of UNGC implementation had positive effects on the per-
ceived legitimacy of the initiative and now increasingly attracts (again?) 
companies that have already achieved high CSR performance and are now 
able to differentiate themselves from lower CSR performers in the UNGC.
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Note
1. A total of 4,150 “Communications on Progress” (COPs) were submitted in 2011 
(UNGC, 2012c). Before eliminating incomplete data, most notably as regards 
company ownership type, the data set comprised 2,807 company COPs. Note 
that the number of submitted COPs may be significantly lower than the number 
of UNGC participants considering that a considerable part of participants did 
not submit a COP in time (“noncommunicating” = 23%), were expelled (963) or 
newly entered (1,861) in 2011.
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